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On today’s Web, users trade access to their private data for content and services. App and
service providers want to know everything they can about their users, in order to improve
their product experience. Also, advertising sustains the business model of many websites and
applications. Efficient and successful advertising relies on predicting users’ actions and tastes
to suggest a range of products to buy. Both service providers and advertisers try to track
users’ behaviour across their product network. For application providers this means tracking
users’ actions within their platform. For third-party services following users, means being
able to track them across different websites and applications. It is well known how, while
surfing the Web, users leave traces regarding their identity in the form of activity patterns
and unstructured data. These data constitute what is called the user’s online footprint. We
analyse how advertising networks build and collect users footprints and how the suggested
advertising reacts to changes in the user behaviour.
Keywords: privacy; ubiquitous-tracking; privacy metrics; advertising;
1. Introduction
Websites use personalisation services to provide a tailored experience to their visi-
tors. In order to make their product more personal to the single users they need to
keep profiles of their users, collect their in page reading activities and eventually
their preferences. This data is then shared to third-party services, accessed and
analysed without users? direct consent. Furthermore, records of users? activities
are used for different purposes, most unknown to the end user, such as market-
ing or to provide analytics services back to the original website or application.
Among the data analysed by websites are also included user preferences and social
connections. These can be obtained by tracking users across different applications
and sites through cookies or open web sessions. Even if the user does not accept
cookies or is not logged into a service account, such as their Google, Twitter or
Facebook accounts, the web page and third-party services can still try to profile
them by using third-party http requests, among other techniques. Within the http
request various selectors can be included to communicate user preferences or par-
ticular features, in the form of URL variables. Features that might be used by
advertising networks and malicious trackers include personalised language or fonts
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settings, browser extensions, in page keywords, battery charge and status, and so
on. These features are then used to identify individual users by restricting the pool
of possible candidates among all the visitors in a certain time frame, location, pro-
file of interests. Unique users can then be distinguished across multiple devices or
sessions.
1.1 Contribution
We have observed how users are tracked across the Web and how the displayed
advertising is tailored even after they have visited a few websites with a certain
interest bias. In previous work [1] [2] we analysed how third-party advertising ser-
vices are able to profile users on a short series of websites visited and how these are
able to follow users while they surf the web. In our study we analyse how the user
profile detected by advertising services can be used to estimate the user privacy
risk on a certain network. We analyse how advertising networks identify a user
and start tracking them, by considering keywords contained in the webpage and
understanding the underlying network structure of tracked domains. We measure
the distance between the observed user profile and the actual user profile, by cate-
gorising the set of keywords contained in web pages and by capturing third-party
http requests. We introduce a set of metrics to express this distance between the
two profiles.
It is important to note that we have considered the case for which users are
not registering, neither connecting any external account, as it could be the case
with services like: Facebook, Google+, Twitter, and so on. In such scenario we
have measured how these networks still attempt to track the user by sending user
information through http requests to their services.
The main contributions of this paper are the following.
(1) We present a model of the user profile that is able to capture how each
website and tracking network categorise their activities in terms of interests
and interactions.
(2) We analyse how much information is sent by each page visited to third-party
services by measuring the partial user profile and the actual user profile.
The partial user profile is what the website and third-party services know
about the user. The actual user profile is instead the full profile measured
at the end of the series of page visited.
(3) We introduce a set of metrics to express the relationship between the partial
and the actual user profile.
(4) We profile third-party http calls sent by Facebook tracking services and
compare this to the the user actual profile.
(5) We model user online footprints as a graph of the actions generated by each
user and analyse the resulting graph structure, identifying known malicious
trackers.
2. State of the Art
Information regarding locations, browsing habits, communication records, health
information, financial information, and general preferences regarding user online
and oﬄine activities are shared by different parties online. This level of access is
often directly granted from the user of such services. In a wide number of occasion
though, private information is captured by online services without the direct user
consent or even knowledge. We believe that the privacy and sensitiveness of the
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information becoming accessible to third parties can be easily overlooked.
Personal computers and more generally communication devices that are carried
around by people are capable of being located, identified and tracked across dif-
ferent locations, networks and services [3]. All these devices can therefore be used
for a variety of surveillance activities, which are in itself detrimental to the user’s
interests. Until recently in fact, the cost of surveillance and tracking of people and
activities was proportional to the cost of directly reaching, asking or following a
single person or a group of people. Technology therefore enhances the surveillance
capabilities by introducing tools that allow the collection of information arising
from a person’s activities. This information can furthermore be combined and in-
ferred, therefore offering a more complete picture of that person.
For example, to personalise their services or offer tailored advertising, web ap-
plications could use tracking services that identify a user through different net-
works [4] [5]. These tracking services usually combine information from different
profiles that users create, for example their Gmail address or their Facebook or
LinkedIn accounts. In addition, specific characteristics of the user’s device can be
used to identify them through different sessions and websites, as described by the
Panopticlick project [6].
Browser fingerprinting is a technique implemented by analytics services and
tracking technologies to identify uniquely a user while they browser different web-
sites. Different features of a specific browser setup can be used to identify uniquely
a user. Supported languages, browser extensions or installed fonts [7] can be used
to identify a browser setup among others. More advanced techniques distinguish
between browsers’ JavaScript execution characteristics [8]. These features are par-
ticularly interesting since they are more difficult to simulate or mitigate in practice.
Targeting JavaScript execution characteristics actually means looking at the innate
performance signature of each browser’s JavaScript engine, allowing the detection
of browser version, operating system and microarchitecture. These attacks can also
work in situations where traditional forms of system identification (such as the
user-agent header) are modified or hidden. Other techniques exploit the whitelist
mechanism of the popular NoScript Firefox extension. This mechanism allows the
user to selectively enabling web pages’ scripting privileges to increase privacy by al-
lowing a site to determine if particular domains exist in a user’s NoScript whitelist.
It is important to note that while tracking creates serious privacy concerns for
internet users, the customisation of results is also beneficial to the end user [9].
In fact, while tailored services offer to the user only information relevant to their
interests, it also allows some companies and institutions to concentrate an enor-
mous amount of information about internet users in general. [10] investigate user
profiling and access mechanisms offered by online data aggregator to users’ col-
lected data. Both the collected data and its accuracy was analysed together with
the user’s concerns. In their findings about 70% of the participants to the study ex-
pressed some concerns about the collection of sensitive data, its level of detail and
how it might be used by third parties, especially for credit and health information.
Generally speaking, the activity of tracking a user across different websites, visits
and devices, involves three main actors: the user, the tracking network, the list of
websites visited. Every time a user visits a website a piece of code on the page is
called asynchronously from the user’s browser. When the call to the tracing network
is performed a number of user data is transferred and used to profile the user at a
later time and/or on a different website or device. By modelling the user behaviour
as a directed graph, it is possible to uncover the underling network structure of the
user footprint and the tracking networks tracing the user across the web [11] [12].
It has been shown how most successful tracking networks exhibit a consistent
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structure across markets, with a dominant connected component that, on average,
includes 92.8% of network vertices and 99.8% of the connecting edges [13]. [13]
have measured the chance that a user will become tracked by all top 10 trackers
in approximately 30 clicks on search results to be of 99.5%. More interesting, [13]
have shown how tracking networks present properties of the small world networks.
Therefore, implying a high-level global and local efficiency in spreading the user
information and delivering targeted ads.
An interesting property of networks to understand their architecture is the be-
haviour of the average degree of nearest neighbours [14] [15]. The average degree
of the nearest neighbours of a node knn(k) is a quantity related to the correlations
between the degree of connected vertices [16], since it can be expressed as the
conditional probability that a given vertex with degree k is connected to a vertex
of degree k′. This property defines if the network in consideration is assortative,
if knn is an increasing function of k or dissortative [17] if it is not. The property
of assortativity has been used in the field of epidemiology, to help understand how
a disease or cure spreads across a network. It is particularly interesting to note
that assortativity can give a measurement if the removal of a set of network’s ver-
tices may correspond in curing, vaccinating or quarantining individual cells in the
network.
Another interesting aspect of networks is the presence of communities. A common
activity when analysing large network is to start finding communities by dividing
the nodes into modules. A common approach applies generative models able to infer
the model parameters directly from the data. A simple generative process is the
Stochastic Block Model (SBM) [18]. A stochastic block model is able to explicitly
describe the global structure of a network, providing a model of how the network
can be partitioned into subgroups (blocks) and how the probability distribution
of the connections between the nodes (i.e. probability that a node is connected to
another) depends on the blocks to which the nodes belong [19].
The microcanonical formulation [20] of blockmodels takes as parameters the
partition of the nodes into groups b and a B×B matrix of edge counts e, where ers is
the number of edges between groups r and s. Since edges are then placed randomly,
nodes belonging to the same group possess the same probability of being connected
with other nodes of the network. Furthermore, to be able to find small groups in
large network nested SBM are used. With nested SBM groups are clustered into
groups, and the matrix e of edge counts are generated recursively from another
SBM [21]. Agglomerative multilevel Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm
as described in [22], can be implied to compute a partition of the resulting graph.
Protection techniques against tracking networks are implemented through soft-
ware agents able to identify if third-party requests are accessing private data. These
agents include Privacy Badger [23], Mozilla Lightbeam [24], Ghostery [25], Ad-
Block [26], and so on. Some of these agents block certain Javascript functions, or
attempts to access determined browser functionalities that can be used to uniquely
identify the user. Some others implement a Tracking Protection Lists (TPL). A
TLP can be seen as a blacklist of identified tracking domains that user might want
to block.
Another interesting aspect of advertising services is how they are designed to
work on feedback loops [27]. An advertising service can in fact be seen as a black-
box providing the tracker trying to identify or profile the user, and the returned
advertising content. The tracker is used to send information back to the advertising
service, which in response will return a certain content tailored to the user prefer-
ences. Within this feedback loop different aspect of the user behaviour are taken
in consideration. These include certainly the users browsing history and their click
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through rate, i.e. a measurement of the amount of time users in a population are
more likely to interact with an ad. In more sophisticated advertising solution also
user social connections are taken in consideration.
Advertising therefore services raise the problem of confidentiality of the user
reading activity [28]. Up to know an eloquent example of this problem was provided
by the way public library in the US operates. Reading activities were considered
historically private and were protected through a set of rules that restricted libraries
ability to exploit reading records. This regime is clearly bypassed when libraries
decide to provide digital services to their users. Digital services providers and third
parties can in fact access users reading activities without agreeing to the library
confidentiality regime.
3. Modelling the user profile
Each time the user visits a new page, we aggregate the page keywords and build
what we consider the user’s profile of interests (Figure 4). We consider a tractable
model of the user profile as a probability mass function (PMF), as proposed in [29,
30], to express how each keyword contributes to expose how many times the user
has indirectly expressed a preference toward a specific category. We consider that
the user expresses a preference when they visit a webpage categorised with certain
keywords. This model follows the intuitive assumption that a particular category
is weighted according to the number of times this has been counted in the user
profile.
We define the profile of a user as the PMF p = (p1, . . . , pL), conceptually a
histogram of relative frequencies of tags across the set of tag categories T . This
means that we group tags around interests using top level categories as defined
by the Open Directory Project (DMOZ) [31]. The user profile is calculated at the
end of the series of website visited by the user. Similarly we define the partial user
profile at moment as this is known to the advertising network as pˆ = (pˆ1, . . . , pˆL).
Note that, for the case when an advertising network is present on each and every
page, pˆ = p at the end of the series of sites visited. This means that the network
was able to record each page visited by the user. This could easily be the page
of advertising networks like Google that through different third-party services are
ubiquitously present across the web.
We also define the profile of an ad, or third-party http request as the PMF
q = (q1, . . . , qL), where ql is the percentage of tags belonging to the category l
which have been assigned to this specific advertising item. You can think of the ad
profile as the PMF of the tag contained in every http request sent from the visited
page to the advertising network (Listings: 1, 2, 3). This profile notes which tags
the tracking network is using to identify the user and display some advertising
content. Note that the ads profile, is calculated independently for each advertising
network.
Both user and ads profiles can then be seen as normalised histograms of tags
across categories of interest. Our profile model is in this extent equivalent to the
tag clouds that numerous collaborative tagging services use to visualise which tags
are being posted, collaboratively or individually by each user. A tag cloud, similarly
to a histogram, is a visual representation in which tags are weighted according to
their relevance.
In view of the assumptions described in the previous section, our privacy attacker
boils down to an entity that aims to profile users by representing their interests in
the form of normalised histograms, on the basis of a given categorisation.
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Figure 1.: Advertising services work in a feedback loop. The image illustrate how
while a user surf a number of web pages, the service record their profile and adapts
the returned advertising.
3.1 Tracking metrics
We consider the third-party advertising network to operate like a recommendation
system that suggest products or services that might be of interest for the user, based
on their preferences. A recommendation system can be described as an information
filtering system that seeks to predict if the user is interested or not in a particular
resource. We assume that the ad server suggests advertising based on a measure of
similarity between what the user does and what the network knows. Furthermore,
we consider tracking service to work in a feedback loop (Figure 1). When a user
surfs the web each tracker on the visited pages communicates with the advertising
service, sending a number of parameters through http requests. These contain the
user preferences and browsing history which will be taken into consideration when
ads are returned to display on the page.
It is important to note that while it is safe to consider an advertising network
as a recommendation system, we should also consider that a number of processes
and interactions between the advertising networks, the website, and the ultimate
advertiser, can influence the actual recommendation that is displayed to the user.
Tracking services can in fact follow different strategies to recommend products to
users. Some services display in page advertising where a bidding mechanism allow
advertisers to compete for categories and spaces, other services might decide to
target only specific categories, others might instead decide to target the visited
page only.
We measure the user profile, as previously described, as a histogram of their
recorded preferences, and the advertising profile as a histogram of the ads that
the user has received. We have considered a set of metric to measure how the
advertising network is tracking the user profile, and how a page sends information
to a tracking service by transmitting a partial user profile.
In previous works[1] [2] we used the 1-norm, 2-norm as measures of how the
advertising profile, or the partial user profile, approximates the user profile. Please
recall that the partial user profile is calculated by a given advertising network at
a given moment on a series of pages visited.
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We now introduce the normalised α-norm as the generalised variation GV be-
tween two probability distributions, the partial and the genuine user profiles. Fur-
thermore, we will introduce the KL-divergence as a measure of how the partial
profile approaches the genuine user profile. Please note that while we are defining
our metrics between the partial user profile and the genuine user profile, the same
assumptions holds, without loss of generality, if we compare the user’s and the
advertising profiles.
3.1.1 Norm and generalised variation
We define the α−norm between the partial profile as observed by an advertising
platform and the genuine user profile as:
‖p− pˆ‖α = α
√∑
l
|pl − pˆl|α with α ∈ [0,∞]
The case for α =∞ is defined in the limit:
lim
α→∞ ‖p− pˆ‖α = limα→∞ α
√∑
l
|pl − pˆl|α ≈ max
l
|pl − pˆl|
The α− norm is a norm in RL with the following properties:
• Absolute homogeneity.
• Positive definiteness: ‖p− pˆ‖α ≤ 0 with equality if p = pˆ and ‖p− pˆ‖α = α
√
2 ⇔
p and pˆ are orthonormal deltas.
• Triangle inequality.
For α = 1 we define the 1-norm between the partial and the genuine user profiles
as:
‖p− pˆ‖1 =
∑
l
|pl − pˆl|
The 1-norm represent the average discrepancy between the two profiles. For
α = 2 we define the 2-norm as:
‖p− pˆ‖2 =
√∑
l
|pl − pˆl|2
The 2-norm represents the Euclidean distance between the two distributions.
When considering the 2-norm it is possible to highlight larger discrepancies on the
set of categories analysed. An interesting property is that norms are also nested.
Hence:
‖p− pˆ‖∞ 6 ‖p− pˆ‖2 6 ‖p− pˆ‖1
We hence define the generalised variation GV(p, pˆ), based on α-norm as:
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GV(p, pˆ)α =
1
α
√
2
‖p− pˆ‖α =
1
α
√
2
α
√∑
l
(pl − pˆl)α, α ∈ [1,∞]
The coefficient 1α√2 normalises the range of values of the α − norm in [0, 1].
Therefore, GV(p, pˆ) is a norm, is positive definite, absolutely homogeneous and
satisfies the triangle inequality:
• GV(p, pˆ) ≥ 0 with equality if and only if p = pˆ
• GV(p, pˆ) ≤ 1 with equality if and only if p and pˆ are orthonormal canonical
vectors (discrete deltas).
Note that for α = 1 the generalised variation GV(p, pˆ) is equal to the total
variation TV(p, pˆ):
TV(p, pˆ) =
1
2
‖p− pˆ‖1 = 1
2
∑
l
|pl − pˆl|
For α = 2 we have the normalised 2-norm:
GV2 =
1√
2
‖p− pˆ‖2 =
1√
2
√∑
l
|pl − pˆl|2
Finally, the case for α =∞, limα→∞GV(p, pˆ)α = ‖p− pˆ‖∞ between p and pˆ. The
reason is that for α 1 the greatest difference dominates in the sum∑l |pl − pˆl|α.
Therefore limα→∞ ‖p− pˆ‖α ≈ maxl |pl − pˆl|.
One might interpret these norms as α = 1 been an average-case metric, α = ∞
being a worst-case scenario, and α = 2 a robust middle ground.
3.1.2 KL-Divergence
Now we propose and justify an information-theoretic quantity as a measure of
how the partial profile approaches the genuine user profile: the KL-divergence.
Suppose that we might interpret the profile pˆ observed by a third-party tracking
service, as a sequence of L independent, identically distributed, drawings of a user’s
genuine profile of interest p. Then in accordance with the rationale proposed in
[32] [33], we may argue that the probability p(pˆ), of a given observed profile is
related to the KL-divergence between the empirical observation pˆ and the ideal
one p, as follows:
− 1
L
log p(pˆ) −−−−→
L→∞
D(pˆ‖p)
Informally this means p(pˆ) ≈ 2−L D(pˆ‖p). Note that small divergences will lead to
likely outcomes, whereas large divergence associate with rare events.
Note also that pˆ is absolutely continuous with respect to p: pl = 0 ⇒ pˆl = 0.
Also pˆ p ⇐⇒ D(pˆ‖p) <∞.
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Figure 2.: Trackers on web pages make third-party http requests to advertising
services. These return ads content tailored to the user web history or expressed
preferences.
4. Modelling the user’s online footprint
We model the user’s activity as series of events belonging to a certain identity.
Each event is a document containing different information. An event correspond
to an action generated by the user or one of their devices. When a user visits a
website or creates a post on a blog, an event is created. We can think of an event as
a hypermedia document i.e. an object possibly containing graphics, audio, video,
plain text and hyperlinks. We call the hyperlinks selectors and we use these to build
the connections between the user’s different identities or events. Each identity can
be a profile or account that the user has created onto a service or platform, or
just a collection of events, revealing something about the user. With account we
mean an application account or a social network account, such as their LinkedIn
or Facebook unique IDs. When the user visit a web page, or uses a web or mobile
application, a series of events is generated and associated with the account. Some
of these events are created by direct user’s actions, others are created by code
triggered indirectly by the user.
While the user visits a webpage and reads its content a series of snippets of
code and client side scripts are executed and information is transmitted to the
page backend or some third-party server. Among the information transferred are a
number of user preferences. These can be their geographical location, battery level
of their current used device, browser preferences, or just their browsing history
captured up to that point. Some or all of the meta and in page keywords used to
describe the page are also transferred. We build the user profile by collecting the
meta keywords expressed in web pages. We consider this a subset of the possible
set of preferences that third-party advertising networks might be interested in
collecting.
4.1 Proposing a model of third-party requests on web pages
When a user visits a web page, the browser sends an http request to the server to
request a representation of the resource described through the url. The server pro-
vides the resource representation in the form of a html document and the browser
parses it. The html document contains a number of links to other resources, such as
JavaScript code, videos, audios or images (Figure: 2). Some of these can be stored
on the same domain as the requested page, some may be requested to third-party
services. Such is the case of services like Google Analytics, share buttons from dif-
ferent social networks, or advertising banners. Together with the http request, a
number of parameters are included. These contains keywords, users? preferences,
information regarding the user device and session, in page information sent to the
third-party service from the website or application.
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Figure 3.: The graph shows how known trackers are connected to visited pages and
therefore how these are able to follow users across different websites.
When a third-party request is performed by the visited page, we store the pa-
rameters passed and if the call belongs to a known tracking network we categorise
the corresponding keywords. Also when a request is made, we store a direct link
between the page and a tracking domain, such as google.com. This results in a
graph model of tracking networks and how these are connected to pages (Figure:
3). The graph model allows us to understand the underling network structure of
tracking networks and how these are pervasively following users across their vis-
its. In fact, every time we discover which tracking services are active on a certain
website, we can create an indirect link between the user and the tracker.
4.2 Network structure metrics
We said that advertising networks or privacy attackers need to be able to follow
the user across as many websites as possible in order to profile their interests. This
naturally translates onto a graph model where each page is directly connected
to its active trackers (Figure: 3). We therefore considered a set of metrics that
can uncover the underlying network structure of tracking service. The first of the
metrics considered is the average degree of the neighbourhood. The average degree
of the neighbourhood of each node is a good indication of how many pages are
connected to a certain advertising service or tracking domain.
The average degree of the neighbourhood of a node i is calculated as:
〈knn,i〉 = 1|N(i)|
∑
j∈N(i)
kj
Where N(i) are the neighbours of node i and kj is the degree of node j which
belongs to N(i).
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If a certain tracker domain is connected to the majority of the page visited by a
certain user, this means that they have been able to collect the user’s preferences
and reading activities across a number of websites. The more a tracker domain is
connected, the more the user might consider this a risk for their privacy. We used
the average degree of the neighbourhood of a tracker to rank tracker domains.
To describe the resulting network structure we also calculated the average scalar
assortativity coefficient [17] defined as:
r =
∑
xy xy(exy − axby)
σaσb
Where ax =
∑
y exy and by =
∑
x exy, and exy is the fraction of edges from a
vertex of type x to a vertex of type y.
We also generated a partition of SBM and nested SBM of the resulting graph
employing an agglomerative multilevel Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) al-
gorithm as described in [22] [34][20]. The idea behind using SBM to describe the
network structure of identified trackers is to be able to identify similar trackers
and to understand if trackers belonging to the same domain or that exhibit similar
behaviour can be grouped based on network properties.
5. Experimental methodology and results
We analysed the browsing habits of 50 users of Twitter, by observing the set
of websites links shared for each of the top categories from the Open Directory
Project (DMOZ) [31] for a total of 100 pages per user. We assumed that the
articles shared on twitter are a subset of the website that each user visit every
day. More importantly if they are active Twitter users, these websites will express
their interest bias towards certain categories. To validate our strategy, we observed
that Twitter itself offer website owners the possibility to track conversions on their
pages coming from tweets and twitter ads. Please note that the list of links was
only considered as a list of website visited, no interaction between Twitter user
was further taken into consideration.
These sites are therefore surfed in our simulation environment. This consist of a
virtual box where a browser instance visits a url and record both in page categories
and third-party requests. In this scenario we pretend that a user is going through
their reading list of sites and by looking at third-party http requests we measure
how the advertising changes in the page and adapts to their profile. The user is
simulated by a software agent opening the urls and scrolling through the page for
a certain arbitrary amount of time.
It is important to note that in our simulated environment the users are not
logged a third-party account, like Google, Facebook or Twitter. When the website
is accessed a text version of the page is recorded and analysed by our software
agent. In page keywords and meta information are extracted and evaluated. We
extracted keywords from the actual text of the page by using the Rapid Automatic
Keyword Extraction (RAKE) [35] algorithm. Each keyword was then evaluated
against Open Directory Project (DMOZ) [31] for classification within top levels
categories.
Once the user profile was calculated the advertising profile is evaluated. The ad-
vertising profile is extracted from url parameters contained in third-party requests.
We have collected information regarding each third-party requests made from each
page visits. These parameters are again evaluated against DMOZ for classification
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Figure 4.: Here we show an example of user profile expressed in absolute terms by
counting the number of keywords in each category for a browsing session. We model
user and advertising profiles as histograms of tags keywords a set of predefined
categories of interest.
within top levels categories. Please note that we have excluded request made to
JavaScript libraries, images and Cascade Style Sheet (CSS) files. We have also ex-
cluded same domain requests, since we were only interested in third-parties http
calls.
By profiling users’ browsing events using a hypermedia document structure we
were able to show how each event contains a set of features regarding the user
identity and the page that was visited. We have therefore categorised each event
by using the keywords contained in the meta information present in the page and
the page text itself (Figure: 4). At each event we ere able to calculate an event
profile, by measuring the set of keywords introduced by each action performed by
the user (i.e. visited a page).
Table 1.: Statistics regarding collected users data
Statistics about collected data
Categories 16 Users 50
Pages per users 100 Total pages 5000
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We profiled 50 users and each user visited a series of 100 pages. In total we
analysed 5000 different pages (Table: 1). For each user we calculated how each
page contributed to the user profile and also how third-party services adapted
to the user profile by returning certain information in form of ads. Information
that advertising services request from the visited page may vary in length and
type (Listings: 1, 2, 3). Some trackers might include only the referrer url and
some devices information and user triggered parameters (Listings: 1, 3) while
other services might be more lengthily in what is sent from the page (Listing: 2).
Some of the information sent through third-party request cannot be categorised,
since they include hashed users? ids and internal keywords and code belonging
to the tracking service. Other information, like the keywords retrieved from the
page (Listing: 2) can be categorised into category of interest that we assume the
tracking service uses to profile the user through their interests.
It is interesting to not how among the parameters sent to the third-party tracking
services are not included just in page keywords regarding the topic of the page,
but also specific browser information. Some of the device’s preferences are included
in the http headers, like the user-agent identifying the browser and the Operative
System. Other information regard how long the page took to load or how soon the
content was ready (Listing: 2).
Listing 1: A third-party request to Amazon Ads Service from the nytimes.com
homepage. In this example keywords are sent directly as parameters in the http
request.
Host : aax.amazon-adsystem.com
User−Agent : Moz i l l a /5 .0 (Macintosh ; I n t e l Mac OS X 10 . 1 1 ; rv : 4 8 . 0 )
Gecko/20100101 F i r e f ox /48 .0
Accept : ∗/∗
Accept−Language : en−US, en ; q=0.5
Accept−Encoding : gzip , d e f l a t e
DNT: 1
Re fe r e r : http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/29/us/politics/donald-trump-congress-gop-voters.html?hp
Params :
ac t i on : c l i c k
pgtype : Homepage
c l i c kSou r c e : story−heading
module : f i r s t −column−r eg ion
reg ion : top-news
WT. nav : top−news
r : 0
Cookie : ad−id=A8rOwZ2wOUK4gka1zjqyWNo ; ad−pr ivacy=0
Connection : keep−a l i v e
Listing 2: A third-party request to krxd.net from a nytimes.com article. This re-
quest send different information regarding the article and the browser preferences
through http parameters. In addition to the keywords associated with the page,
we can see how the request includes information regarding how long it took for the
content to be ready param : tcontentready as well as how much it took for the
browser window to load param : twindowload.
GET / p i x e l . g i f ?
Params :
source : smarttag
kcp s : nytimes
kcp s c : us
k cp s s c : politics
kcp d : www. nytimes . com
kp r e f : http ://www. nytimes . com/
kua kx lang : en−us
kua kx tech browser l anguage : en−us
kpa page type=a r t i c l e
kpa cg : us
kpa scg : p o l i t i c s
kpa pst : News
kpa des : Presidential Election of 2016
kpa per : Lujan Ben Ray
kpa org : Republican Party
kpa author : Alexander Burns and Jonathan Martin
kpa keywords2 : Presidential Election of 2016 Elections House of Representatives Politics Action
Committees Elections Senate Republican Party Lujan Ben Ray Issa Darrell Trump Donald
t cont en t r eady : 1792
t window load : 12720
. . .
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Host : beacon.krxd.net
User−Agent : Moz i l l a /5 .0 (Macintosh ; I n t e l Mac OS X 10 . 1 1 ; rv : 4 8 . 0 ) Gecko/20100101 F i r e f ox
/48 .0
Accept : ∗/∗
Accept−Language : en−US, en ; q=0.5
Accept−Encoding : gzip , d e f l a t e
DNT: 1
Re fe r e r : http ://www. nytimes . com/2016/08/29/ us/ p o l i t i c s /donald−trump−congress−gop−vote r s .
html?hp&act i on=c l i c k&pgtype=Homepage&c l i c kSou r c e=story−heading&module=f i r s t −column−
r eg ion&reg ion=top−news&WT. nav=top−news& r=0
Cookie : ServedBy=beacon−a262−dub ; ku id =DNT
Connection : keep−a l i v e
Listing 3: A third-party request to facebook.com from a indipendent.co.uk article.
Host : graph.facebook.com
User−Agent : Moz i l l a /5 .0 (Macintosh ; I n t e l Mac OS X 10 . 1 1 ; rv : 4 8 . 0 ) Gecko/20100101 F i r e f ox
/48 .0
Accept : ∗/∗
Accept−Language : en−US, en ; q=0.5
Accept−Encoding : gzip , d e f l a t e , br
DNT: 1
Re fe r e r : http ://www. independent . co . uk/news/uk/ p o l i t i c s / europe−could−go−down−the−drain−
a f t e r−brex i t−a7213976 . html
Cookie : datr=TbHdVa−yyYq 3UHH xYR6NGb ; f r=0MuKlsg7QM3etJaWt .AWVJMdGky V9X82TY03Y−wBtGqE.
BV3bFx .XF. FfD . 0 . 0 .BXw9oU.AWVWPpAJ; lu=TggRyE6qvvdCystV9I2G−b0w ; ga=GA1
.2 .1182524233 .1441193978 ; sb=i14HV4ufa1WguCxPntCQagP0 ; c u s e r =100007394807876; xs
=192%3AnWrYMasjLyLusw%3A2%3A1365011662%3A5189 ; csm=2; s=Aa4hJAWUyE0HSY M.BXj1Ln ; p l=
n ; p=−2; act=1472453154239%2F0 ; presence=
EDvF3EtimeF1472453144EuserFA21B07394807876A2EstateFDutF1472453144216Et2F 5b 5d
Elm2FnullEuct2F1472410836BEtrFA2
loadA2EtwF240195646EatF1472453143045CEchFDp 5f1B07394807876F2CC
Connection : keep−a l i v e
Once we were able to collect and profile readable keywords from http requests,
we wanted to know how each page contribute to how much tracking services know
about our genuine user profile by observing a series of web pages visited. For each
users we calculated the TV, the GV2, the∞-norm and the KL-divergence between
the partial and the genuine user profile (Figure: 9). The metrics were calculated
for 80 visited, while the genuine user profile was calculated over a series of 100
visits. Therefore, in our scenario, if a tracker is present in each visited page they
would know, in the worst case scenario 80% of the visited pages. Note that the TV
gives a measure of the average discrepancy between the probability distributions,
while the ∞-norm gives the worst case scenario. From our results we see that the
worst case scenario and the average one behave similarly.
We have then analysed the case of a tracker that is not present in each of the
visited pages. We considered the facebook third-party requests to their services for
this experiment. For each user we calculated the TV, the GV2, the ∞-norm and
the KL-divergence between the partial and the genuine user profile (Figure: 10)
for pages where the tracker is present.
Finally we profiled keywords in third-party http requests to Facebook. We wanted
to know what information were sent to Facebook for each page visited where the
tracker was present. This is important to understand what trackers are able to
capture about users preferences if they are not able to follow the user across all
the pages visited. We assumed that if a tracker is not present on a page, they have
no knowledge the user visited it, therefore the partial profile as it is known to the
tracker is not modified.
Note also that although none of the users considered in our experiment where
logged into Facebook, web pages consistently send data to their third-party tracking
services. This means that users are profiled by Facebook even if these are not logged
in their platform, and individuals that have decided to opt out of Facebook continue
to be targeted and known to their services. This is evident by the request shown
on listings 3. A number of browser and device specific information is collected
by the http call although the user isn’t connected to Facebook. For each users
we calculated the TV, the GV2, the ∞-norm and the KL-divergence between the
advertising profile q and the genuine user profile p (Figure: 11) for pages where the
tracker is present. We considered a shorter series of pages (15 pages) following the
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intuition that advertising networks might try to form a profile of the user instantly
given a small number of visits to similar pages. This was consistent with previous
results obtained [2].
We have also analysed network structure among the discovered trackers. By
using our footprint model we also considered how tracker domains are linked to
pages. In this case we calculated the average degree of the neighbourhood of each
node, for nodes corresponding to advertising services. Our results show how it is
possible to identify known tracker domains by measuring the average degree of the
neighbourhood (Table: 2).
Considering the average degree of the neighbourhood of each node, we can also
find out about some interesting properties of the network. We started considering
the in-degree distribution of the network (Figure: 5). The degree distribution P (k)
of a network is defined as the fraction of nodes in the network with degree k. It
is particularly interesting to note that the network in-degree distribution approxi-
mately follow a power law.
Another interesting property to consider is assortativity. Assortativity considers
the conditional probability that a node of degree k is connected to a node with
degree k’. If the probability function is increasing, the network is said to be as-
sortative, showing that nodes of high degree are more likely to connect to nodes
of high degree. If the function is decreasing the network is dissortative, meaning
nodes of high degree are more likely to connect to nodes of lower degree. We found
that the scalar assortative coefficient for the resulting graph is of -0.19 a value that
is often found for internet systems [36].
Tracker domain avg knn,i
tacoda.at.atwola.com 180.0
bcp.crwdcntrl.net 180.0
match.prod.bidr.io 180.0
glitter.services.disqus.com 180.0
ad.afy11.net 180.0
idsync.rlcdn.com 180.0
mpp.vindicosuite.com 180.0
aka-cdn-ns.adtechus.com 180.0
clients6.google.com 180.0
i.simpli.fi 180.0
ads.p161.net’ 180.0
dis.criteo.com 180.0
ads.stickyadstv.com 180.0
cms.quantserve.com 180.0
ads.yahoo.com 129.0
graph.facebook.com 118.0
ib.adnxs.com 110.0
rs.gwallet.com 108.0
bid.g.doubleclick.net 98.333
googleads4.g.doubleclick.net 98.333
Table 2.: The table shows the top 20 identified tracker domains based on the
average degree of the neighbourhood.
We also generated a partition of SBM and nested SBM of the resulting graph
(Figures: 6 and 7). Here we identified how the resulting network partitions and
communities corresponds to know tracker domains. This means tracking service
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Figure 5.: Degree distribution for the network resulting from the footprint model
of users activity. We can see how the degree distribution follows a power law.
exhibit similar properties across the same domain and its structure can be identified
through statistical inference over the graph.
Furthermore we also computed page-rank algorithm among the network and
identified most connected tracked domains (Figure: 8). Again we were able to
spot known tracker domains.
6. Conclusions and future work
We introduced a set of metrics to show how information is sent to third-party
tracking services when users surf the web. Because we considered users that were
not logged into any identity account, such as Twitter, Google+ or Facebook, we
show how third-party service were still able to collect valuable information. We
computed the set of metrics for the partial user profile at each page visited. This
shows how each page contribute to the actual user profile at the end of a series
of websites visited. This means that an advertising network that is present on
most of the pages visited possess a large amount of information regarding users
and population of users. This information finally allows networks to predict fairly
quickly user’s preferences and behaviour. We also computed a set of network analy-
sis on our graph model of the user online footprint. We were able to identify known
trackers and isolate communities of similar trackers. This aspect is particularly
interesting for the development of Privacy Enhancing Technologies for the web.
Up to now, anti-tracking technologies have been built to simply stop third-party
requests, alternative strategies might instead consider to send bogus information to
certain over-connected tracker domains to masquerade the user real profile. At the
same time a measurement of the average degree of the neighbourhood of a certain
third-party domain can be used to evaluate how dangerous this can be considered
for the user’s privacy. In future research we would like to further explore the graph
model introduced, while continuing to understand how quickly web advertising is
able to match the served ads with the actual user profile. Particularly we would
like to consider real browsing patterns or interactions on social networks possibly
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Figure 6.: Block-model decomposition of the network. We can see how we can
identify known tracker networks, and how trackers can be grouped into communi-
ties that exhibits similar network structure. The blue squares represent the block
partition of the network. While the legend is referred to the original nodes, here
represented by the shapes on the border.
using a voluntary set of real users. This would allow us to understand if different
profiles for the same users can be somehow linked together within similar advertis-
ing networks. Moreover, we want to enlarge the set of users analysed by testing on
logs from a real world small computer network, while also introducing new metrics
to our study. We also believe in the importance to provide users with simple vi-
sualisation tools able to show the user their online footprint and allowing them to
take action to masquerade their interests profile or simply block certain networks.
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from our simulation. Here we highlight connections between known tracker net-
works and visited page.
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